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Permanent partial disability (PPD) cash benefits constitute the most 
expensive and complex type of benefit provided by workers’ compensa-
tion programs.1 PPD benefits are paid to workers whose workplace in-
juries have consequences that are permanent but not totally disabling.2 
This chapter provides an overview of the previous research on PPD 
benefits, with particular emphasis on the contributions of Terry Thoma-
son, and indicates the topics for which additional research is needed.
INTRODUCTION TO PPD BENEFITS 
The importance of PPD benefits in the U.S. workers’ compensation 
program and the variability among states in the relative importance of 
PPD benefits are shown in 1999 data on incurred cash benefits (Blum 
and Burton 2003). Nationally, temporary total disability (TTD) benefits 
are more common than PPD benefits (Figure 4.1), and permanent total 
disability (PTD) benefits and fatal benefits are much more expensive 
per case than PPD benefits (Figure 4.2). However, the total expendi-
tures on PPD benefits per 100,000 workers account for over 70 percent 
of all cash benefits nationally (Figure 4.3). Blum and Burton (2003) 
also report that nationally PPD cash benefits increased from $14.4 mil-
lion per 100,000 workers in 1996 to $17.2 million in 1999.
There are significant differences among states in these measures 
of incurred PPD benefits, as shown in the lowest, first quartile, mean, 
median, third quartile, and highest values for the 46 jurisdictions with 
data. The frequency of PPD claims per 100,000 workers varies from 
70  Burton
1,221 in California to 128 in the District of Columbia, almost a tenfold 
difference (Figure 4.4). The average cost of cash benefits per PPD case 
varies from $86,872 in Michigan to $13,909 in Indiana, a more than 
sixfold difference (Figure 4.5). As measured by total expenditures on 
PPD cash benefits per 100,000 workers, the $43.3 million in California 
is more than 10 times the $4.1 million in Utah (Figure 4.6).
One research task is to explain the interstate and intertemporal dif-
ferences in these measures of incurred PPD benefits. One logical de-
terminant of the amount of incurred cash benefits in a state is the gen-
erosity of the benefits prescribed by the state’s workers’ compensation 
statute. Another obvious candidate for a variable that would explain 
interstate differences in incurred benefits is the state’s injury rate.3
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING PPD 
BENEFITS
Permanent Consequences of Workplace Injuries and Diseases: 
Terminology and Concepts
There are significant differences among the states and provinces in 
their approaches to compensating permanent disabilities. Furthermore, 
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Figure 4.3  Cash Benefits per 100,000 Workers in 1999, National 























Figure 4.4  Permanent Partial Disability Benefits Frequency per 100,000 





















among jurisdictions using the same approach, the terminology used to 
describe the same approach may differ. Thus, a common set of terms 
is a practical necessity for effective interjurisdictional comparisons re-
garding PPD benefits.
Three time periods
 As shown in Figure 4.7, three time periods are pertinent in com-
pensating a worker with an injury serious enough to result in PPD ben-
efits. The preinjury period is relevant because inter alia the employee’s 
average wage is used in calculating the cash benefits after the worker 
is injured. The temporary disability period refers to the time from the 
onset of the injury or disease until the date of maximum medical im-
provement (MMI) has been reached; the permanent disability period 
refers to the period following MMI. The distinction between the tem-
porary and permanent disability periods is important because workers’ 
compensation programs provide different types of cash benefits in the 
two periods.
What are the permanent consequences? 
Most workers injured on the job fully recover by the date of MMI 
and thus sustain no permanent consequences from the injury. For those 
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Figure 4.5  Permanent Partial Disability Benefits, Average Cash Benefits 























Figure 4.6  Permanent Partial Disability Benefits, Cash Benefits per 
























workers with relatively serious injuries, several permanent consequenc-
es are possible. There may be a persistence of pain and suffering and a 
continuing need for medical care and rehabilitation. Of particular inter-
est are the other permanent consequences (shown in Figure 4.8) be-
cause they are the focus of most of the debate concerning the optimal 
design of PPD benefits.4
 A permanent impairment is any anatomic or functional abnormality 
or loss that remains after MMI has been achieved. Amputated limbs or 
enervated muscles are examples of permanent impairments. The impair-
ment probably causes the worker to experience functional limitations. 
Physical performance may be limited in such activities as walking, 
climbing, reaching, and hearing; furthermore, the worker’s emotional 
and mental performance may be adversely affected or limited.
Functional limitations, in turn, are likely to result in a disability, 
of which there are two types: work disability and nonwork disability. 
Work disability can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of 
earning capacity, which results in actual wage loss. In a strict sense, 
these two aspects of work disability must accompany one another. An 
actual loss of earnings only occurs if there is loss of earning capacity. 
Nevertheless, the distinction is important because (as discussed later) 
some types of workers’ compensation benefits are based solely on a 
determination of a presumed loss of earning capacity, while other types 
of benefits require demonstration of actual wage loss. 
Nonwork disability includes the loss of the capacities for other as-
pects of life, such as recreation and the performance of household tasks, 
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Figure 4.7 Three Time Periods in a Workers’ Compensation Case Where  
the Injury Has Permanent Consequences
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and can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of capacity for 
nonwork activities which results in actual noneconomic loss. Again, in 
a strict sense, these two aspects of nonwork disability must accompany 
one another, but at least conceptually they can be measured separately.
Factors that affect the magnitudes of the permanent  
consequences
The relationships shown in Figure 4.8 indicate chains of causation 
that begin with the worker’s injury, which in turn results in permanent 
impairment, functional limitations, work disability, and nonwork dis-
ability. However, the chains of causation are neither automatic nor are 
they immutable because they are the result of factors that are uncon-
trollable after the date of injury. Rather, as shown in Table 4.1, in each 
stage in the chains of causation there are also factors controllable by the 
worker, or by participants in the delivery system for workers’ compen-
sation benefits, or by public policy.5
Stage 1—the movement from the injury or disease to the permanent 
impairment—will be affected by such controllable factors as the quality 
of the medical care received by the worker and by such uncontrollable 
factors as the worker’s previous health status. Stage 2—the movement 
from the permanent impairment to the functional limitations—is also 
affected by controllable factors (such as the quality of medical reha-
bilitation) and uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s prior physi-
cal condition). Likewise, stage 3A—the progression from functional 












Figure 4.8 Permanent Consequences of an Injury or Disease
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Table 4.1  Factors That Affect the Extent of the Permanent Consequences
Stage 1 Injury to Permanent Impairment
Controllable factors include Medical care
Uncontrollable factors include Prior health status
Stage 2 Permanent Impairment to Functional Limitations
Controllable factors include Medical rehabilitation
Uncontrollable factors include Prior physical condition
Stage 3A Functional Limitations to Loss of Earning Capacity
Controllable factors include Vocational rehabilitation
Uncontrollable factors include Age, prior education, prior work 
experience
Stage 4A Loss of Earning Capacity to Actual Wage Loss
Controllable factors include Employer return-to-work policies, 
reasonable accommodations at work 
site; design of benefits (affecting 
incentive to return to work)
Uncontrollable factors include General state of the labor market
Stage 3B Functional Limitations to Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities
Controllable factors include Rehabilitation (such as training to 
operate modified automobile)
Uncontrollable factors include Age, prior experience
Stage 4B Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities to Actual Noneconomic Loss
Controllable factors include Redesigned facilities or equipment 
(such as modified automobile)
Uncontrollable factors include None, perhaps
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lable factors (the quality of vocational rehabilitation, for example) and 
uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s age and prior work experi-
ence). Finally, in stage 4A—the actual wage loss resulting from the loss 
of earning capacity—other factors will influence the outcome, such as 
the employer’s return-to-work policies (controllable) and the general 
state of the labor market (uncontrollable for a particular employer or 
worker). Table 4.1 also catalogues several controllable and uncontrolla-
ble factors that affect the extent of loss of capacity for nonwork activity 
resulting from functional limitations (stage 3B) and the amount of ac-
tual noneconomic loss resulting from the loss of capacity for nonwork 
activity (stage 4B).
The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable factors in 
Table 4.1 is not meant to provide a rigid classification scheme, nor is 
the list of factors meant to be exhaustive. One purpose of the table is 
to suggest that some factors that affect the chains of causation between 
the initial injury or disease and the ultimate work or nonwork disabil-
ity can be influenced by workers, employers, physicians, rehabilitation 
providers, and others in the workers’ compensation delivery system, or 
by policymakers who design the workers’ compensation PPD benefits 
system; however, other factors can not be influenced. 
Another purpose of Table 4.1 is to emphasize that there are numer-
ous factors that affect all of the stages in the chains of causation. As a 
result, knowing the extent of a worker’s loss for any of the intermediary 
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 may not provide a good prediction 
of the extent of the loss for a subsequent consequence. The accuracy 
of predictions of actual wage losses from the ratings of loss of earning 
capacity, and other such purported relationships among the various per-
manent consequences of work-related injuries or diseases, including the 
efficacy of intervention at various stages of the disability determination 
process, are empirical issues that deserve further research.
The Effect of Work Injuries on Earnings
The loss of earnings resulting from a work-related injury or disease 
that has permanent consequences is illustrated by Figure 4.9. Prior to 
the injury, the wages increased through time from A to B, reflecting the 
worker’s increasing productivity as well as general inflation. At point 
B, the worker experienced a work-related injury that permanently re-
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duced his earnings. Had he not been injured, his earnings would have 
continued to grow along the line BC. Although these potential earn-
ings cannot be observed for the injured worker, they can be estimated 
from information on what happened after point B to earnings of similar 
workers who were not injured.
The injured worker’s actual earnings in this example dropped from 
B to D and continued at this zero earnings level until point E, when the 
worker returned to work at wage level F. Thereafter, actual earnings 
grew along the line FG. This example assumes that the worker’s actual 
earnings never return to the potential earnings (line BC) that he would 
have earned if he had never been injured. The worker’s “true” wage 
loss due to the injury is equal to the worker’s potential earnings after the 
date of injury (BC) minus the worker’s actual earnings after the date of 
injury (BDEFG).6  
Of course, not all workers with permanent impairments resulting 
from their work injuries have wage histories that correspond to the ex-
ample in Figure 4.9. Some may return to their old jobs at the wage they 
would have earned if they had never been injured; others may experi-
ence a total loss of earnings from their injuries. The example shown 
illustrates an intermediate case, in which the worker has a partial but 
not total loss of earnings.
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There are a myriad of issues that must be resolved in order to mea-
sure the actual loss of earnings resulting from work-related injuries and 
the workers’ compensation benefits actually received by workers as a 
result of those injuries. These issues and a catalogue of research topics 
are presented in Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).7
WHICH PERMANENT CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE 
COMPENSABLE?
The taxonomy of the permanent consequences of workplace injuries 
provided in the previous section serves as a basis for the design of a PPD 
benefits system. One policy issue that implicitly or explicitly has to be 
resolved in any jurisdiction in order to design this system pertains to the 
purpose of the PPD benefits.8  
The obligation of the workers’ compensation program to provide 
medical care and rehabilitation services is generally accepted (although 
in some jurisdictions, there is disagreement about the extent of vocational 
rehabilitation services to which the worker is entitled). Conversely, in 
most jurisdictions there is general agreement that the worker is not en-
titled to benefits because of pain and suffering.9 The rationale often given 
is that the original design of workers’ compensation involved a trade-off, 
in which the employee is eligible for benefits without demonstrating em-
ployer fault and the employer’s liability is limited to certain consequences 
of the injury, which not did encompass pain and suffering.
Most of the recent controversy over which of the permanent conse-
quences of a work-related injury deserve compensation involves argu-
ments concerning the four permanent consequences shown in Figure 
4.8. Because the four consequences are sequential and interdependent, 
a particular consequence may be endorsed as a basis for compensation 
because it serves as a convenient proxy for other consequences of primary 
concern.
Thus, one may argue that the amount of the PPD benefits should op-
erationally be based on the extent of the worker’s impairment when the 
real concern is for the work disability caused by the impairment. This 
indirect route to compensating work disability may be chosen because 
impairment may be easier to measure than work disability. Unfortunately, 
those who favor payment when the worker suffers an impairment do not 
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always make clear whether this payment is meant to compensate for the 
existence of the impairment by itself or is meant to compensate for the 
work disability (or some other consequence) that is expected to result 
from the impairment.
To the extent that the rationale for benefits is discernable, however, 
two schools of thought can be identified. One view considers lost wages 
due to the injury (work disability) as the sole justification for workers’ 
compensation benefits. Supporters of this position recognize that some 
jurisdictions pay benefits on the basis of an evaluation of the extent of 
impairment or of some of the other permanent consequences in Figure 4.8 
prior to actual wage loss, but argue that when such evaluations are made, 
wage loss is conclusively presumed. The jurisdiction, in short, compen-
sates on the basis of one of these intermediate consequences because it 
serves as a proxy for wage loss.
An alternative view of the rationale for benefits for workers with 
permanent consequences of their injuries accepts work disability as the 
primary basis for benefits, but argues that there is a secondary role for 
benefits paid for nonwork disability. Arguments for these “impairment 
benefits” indicate that the purpose is not only to compensate impairment 
per se but to also use permanent impairment as a convenient proxy for the 
functional limitations and nonwork disability that result from the impair-
ment. A variant on this alternative view is to argue that nonwork disability 
merits compensation, and that the degree of permanent impairment serves 
as a proxy for the extent of nonwork disability.10
The dominant view probably is that the only permanent conse-
quences that warrant benefits in a workers’ compensation program are 
medical care, rehabilitation, and work disability. There are, however, 
several jurisdictions that explicitly adopted benefits for nonwork dis-
ability, including Florida (which paid what were termed “permanent 
impairment” benefits from 1979 to 1993) and most Canadian provinces, 
such as Ontario (which pays noneconomic loss benefits). One provoca-
tive research question is why Canadian provinces are much more recep-
tive to paying noneconomic loss benefits than U.S. states? 
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THE THREE BASIC OPERATIONAL APPROACHES TO PPD 
BENEFITS
Among those states in which work disability is the sole reason why 
PPD benefits are paid, most jurisdictions use another of the permanent 
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 as a proxy or predictor of the ex-
tent of work disability. This section provides an overview of the basic 
operational approaches for PPD benefits found in U.S. and Canadian 
jurisdictions.11
Three Basic Operational Approaches for Work Disability Benefits 
Three basic operational approaches for work disability benefits, 
plus variants of each of the three basic approaches, are shown in Table 
4.2.12 The operational approaches represent the building blocks for PPD 
benefits systems. The difference among the three basic operational ap-
proaches depends on which of the permanent consequences shown in 
Figure 4.8 is used as a proxy for or measurement of work disability. 
Operational Approach I: The permanent impairment
approach
The first basic operational approach, the permanent impairment ap-
proach, evaluates the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impair-
ment and/or functional limitations resulting from the work-related in-
jury.13 An impairment rating is made, which is used to determine the 
amount of the PPD benefits.  
The first variant of the permanent impairment approach is the 
“pure” permanent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A). 
As indicated in Table 4.2, the only worker-specific factor that affects 
the amount of PPD benefits in this approach is the size of the permanent 
impairment rating. This presumably provides a very rough proxy for the 
worker’s actual loss of wages, but a few jurisdictions nonetheless rely 
on this approach for work disability benefits.
The second variant of the permanent impairment approach is the 
permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach (Operational Ap-
proach I.B). This approach multiplies the permanent impairment rating 
by a weekly benefit that is largely determined by the worker’s weekly 
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Table 4.2  Operational Approaches for Permanent Disability Benefits
Operational Approach I: The Permanent Impairment Approach
 Operational Approach IA: The “Pure” Permanent Impairment Approach
1.  The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the 
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2.  The worker’s permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits are determined by 
multiplying the rating by a dollar amount per point that does not vary among 
individuals on the basis of their preinjury wages.
 Operational Approach IB: The Permanent Impairment and Preinjury   
 Wage Approach
1.  The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the 
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2.  The duration of the PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the rating times 
a duration specified in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3.  The weekly PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly benefit is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly benefits.a
Operational Approach II:  The Loss of Earning Capacity (LEC) Approach
 Operational Approach IIA:  The Ad Hoc Loss of Earning Capacity   
 Approach
1.  The worker is given an LEC rating based on the facts of the particular case, 
which includes the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors, 
such as the worker’s age, occupation, education, and prior work experience. 
2.  The duration of the PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the LEC rating 
times a duration specified in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3.  The weekly PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly benefit is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly benefits.b
 Operational Approach IIB: The Loss of Earning Capacity by Formula   
 Approach
1.  The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on a formula, 
which considers the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors, 
such as the worker’s age, occupation, and education.
2.  The duration of the PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the rating times 
a duration specified in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
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3.  The weekly PPD benefit is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly benefit is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly benefits.
 
 Operational Approach IIC:  The “Pure” Loss of Earning Capacity Approach
1.  The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on the facts of the 
case or based on a formula.
2.  The rating is used to determine the amount of PPD benefits using a formula 
that does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury wages.
III.  Operational Approach III: The Actual Wage Loss Approach
 Operational Approach IIIA: The “Pure” Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability periodc and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the 
permanent disability period.
2.  The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects 
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the 
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing 
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3.  If the worker’s actual wage loss is zero (or a negative number), there are no 
PPD benefits.
4.  The duration of the PPD benefit depends on the duration of the worker’s 
actual wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
5.  The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the actual wage loss by a 
percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly benefit is subject to minimum and/
or maximum weekly benefits.
 Operational Approach IIIB: The Limited Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability periodd and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the 
permanent disability period.
2.  The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects 
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the 
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing 
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3.  The worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the workers’ projected 
wages in the permanent disability period times either (c) the worker’s loss of 
earning capacity rating or (d) the worker’s permanent impairment rating;  
and/or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the actual wage loss 
in excess of a threshold that is a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage.e
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4.  The worker’s compensable wage loss is the lesser of the worker’s actual wage 
loss or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss. 
5.  If the worker’s compensable wage is zero (or a negative number), there are no 
PPD benefits.
6.  The duration of the PPD benefit depends on the duration of the worker’s 
compensable wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
7.  The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the compensable wage loss by 
a percentage (e.g., 66 ⅔ percent); the weekly benefit is subject to minimum 
and/or maximum weekly benefits.
a In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD benefits is fixed and the rating is used 
to help determine the weekly PPD benefit.
b In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD benefits is fixed and the rating is used 
to help determine the weekly PPD benefit.
c In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
d In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
e The choice among the worker’s loss of earning capacity rating or the worker’s 
permanent impairment rating or the threshold linked to preinjury wages varies 
among jurisdictions.
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wage prior to the workplace injury. This variant is more closely aligned 
with the idea that the purpose of PPD benefits is to compensate for work 
disability.
Operational Approach II: The loss of earning capacity
approach
The loss of earning capacity approach considers the seriousness of 
the worker’s permanent impairment and functional limitations, as well 
as other factors that may affect the loss of the worker’s earning capacity 
resulting from the injury. These factors may include the worker’s age, 
prior education, and prior work experience. In addition, factors such 
as the job opportunities in a given location may be considered. After 
all the factors relied on in the particular jurisdiction are considered, a 
rating of the worker’s loss of earning capacity due to the work-related 
injury or disease is produced. In turn, that rating is used to determine 
the duration (or, in some jurisdictions, the weekly amount) of the PPD 
benefits. Loss of earning capacity is presumably used as a proxy for the 
actual wage loss that is expected to result. 
The first variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the ad 
hoc loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.A in 
Table 4.2). The extent of the loss of earning capacity is decided on the 
facts of the case, which may vary from case to case in the same juris-
diction depending on the predilections of the parties (including the ad-
ministrative law judge) involved in the case. This approach multiplies 
the loss of earning capacity rating by a maximum duration specified in 
the statute to determine the duration of the worker’s PPD benefits. The 
weekly benefit is largely determined by the worker’s weekly wage prior 
to the workplace injury.
The second variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the 
loss of earning capacity by formula approach (Operational Approach 
II.B in Table 4.2). The worker’s permanent impairment rating is modi-
fied by a formula that considers factors such as the worker’s age or 
occupation in order to determine the loss of earning capacity. The third 
variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the “pure” loss of 
earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.C in Table 4.2). 
The worker’s loss of earning capacity is determined based either on the 
facts of the particular case or on a formula. The loss of earning capac-
ity rating is then used to determine the amount of PPD benefits based 
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on factors such as the extent of the loss of earning capacity. However, 
the benefit does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury 
wages.14
Operational Approach III: The actual wage loss approach
The actual wage loss approach determines the actual wage loss due 
to the work-related injury by comparing the worker’s earnings in the pe-
riod after the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) with the 
worker’s earnings before the date of injury. The duration and amount 
of PPD benefits are then related to the duration and amount of actual 
wage loss.
The first variant of the actual wage loss approach is the “pure” ac-
tual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A). As explicated 
in Table 4.2, this approach defines actual wage loss as the difference 
between the worker’s projected earnings in the permanent disability 
period and the worker’s actual earnings in that period. If the worker 
can demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the workplace 
injury or disease, the weekly PPD benefit is calculated as a percent of 
the actual wage and is paid for the duration of the wage loss (subject to 
statutory limits on the duration).
The second variant of the actual wage loss approach is the limited 
actual wage loss approach. The details of the approach are shown in Ta-
ble 4.2. The distinguishing feature of this approach is that the worker’s 
compensable wage loss is limited by the extent of the worker’s loss of 
earning capacity, or by the extent of the worker’s permanent impair-
ment, or by the amount of actual wage loss above a threshold that is 
a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, or by a combination of the 
limiting factors. For example, if the worker’s actual earnings in the per-
manent disability period are 75 percent below the projected earnings, 
but the worker is considered to have only lost 25 percent of preinjury 
earning capacity, then the PPD benefits will be based on the 25 percent 
figure. Another example is that if the worker had preinjury wages of 
$500 per week and has actual wage loss of $100 per week in the perma-
nent disability period, but the state limits compensable wage loss to the 
amount in excess of 15 percent of the worker’s preinjury wages, then 
the compensable wage loss is only $25 per week.
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The essential attributes of the actual wage loss approach
There is a critical distinction between the first two operational ap-
proaches—the permanent impairment operational approach and the 
loss of earning capacity approach—and the actual wage loss approach. 
The states that rely on the actual wage loss approach require the worker 
1) to demonstrate that a work-related injury has produced a permanent 
impairment and/or loss of earning capacity15 and 2) to demonstrate that 
he or she has experienced an actual loss of earnings because of the 
work-related injury or disease. In contrast, the impairment and loss of 
earning capacity approaches will pay PPD benefits even if there is no 
actual loss of earnings so long as the worker can demonstrate that the 
work injury caused a diminution in one of the proxies for actual wage 
loss.
The elusive nature of the actual wage loss approach
As discussed in more detail later, the actual wage loss approach—
which requires that cases be kept open for extended periods—can easily 
be transformed in practice into the loss of earning capacity approach 
through the use of compromise and release agreements.
The Operational Approach for Nonwork Disability Benefits
As previously indicated, a few jurisdictions, in addition to compensat-
ing for work disability, also provide injured workers with an additional 
benefit that is designed to compensate for noneconomic loss (or nonwork 
disability). For example, permanent impairment benefits were available 
in Florida from 1979 to 1993, while noneconomic loss benefits have been 
paid in Ontario since 1990. The operational basis for the noneconomic 
loss benefits in both Florida and Ontario corresponds to the “pure” per-
manent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A) shown in Table 
4.2.16 
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HOW STATES DESIGN SYSTEMS OF PPD BENEFITS
Common Distinctions within States for PPD Benefits
All jurisdictions have different PPD benefits (measured by weekly 
amount or potential duration) for different categories of injuries and 
diseases, and some jurisdictions use different operational approaches 
for different categories of injuries. The most common distinctions in-
volve three factors.
1) Distinctions between diseases and injuries. Several states pro-
vide more restrictive PPD benefits for diseases than for injuries.17 Mon-
tana, for example, does not provide compensation for partial disability 
resulting from a disease. 
2) Distinctions between different types of injuries. Most states treat 
scheduled injuries differently than nonscheduled injuries. Unfortunate-
ly, these terms are not used in a uniform and unambiguous fashion. The 
workers’ compensation statutes in most states contain a schedule that 
lists the number of weeks or the dollar amounts of compensation ben-
efits to be paid for the physical loss or (in most jurisdictions) the loss 
of use of specified parts of the body. A scheduled injury is any injury 
that is specifically enumerated in the workers’ compensation statute and 
typically involves injuries to the upper and lower extremities (arms, 
legs, hands, feet, fingers, and toes).18 Injuries to the trunk, back, internal 
organs (such as heart or lungs), nervous system, and other body systems 
usually are not included in the list of injuries found in the statutes; these 
are nonscheduled injuries (or unscheduled injuries). I describe these 
states as the “scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.”
A significant minority of states do not distinguish between sched-
uled injuries and nonscheduled injuries in the sense I use those terms: 
the former are specifically listed in the workers’ compensation statute 
and the latter are not. These unitary rating system states treat all injuries 
the same way in the workers’ compensation statute, either by specifying 
that a particular rating system should be used for all injuries or by au-
thorizing the workers’ compensation agency to adopt a comprehensive 
rating system.19
3) Distinctions between injuries with different degrees of severity. 
Within the category of PPD benefits, many jurisdictions provide more 
generous benefits (in terms of weekly amount and/or potential duration) 
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for more serious injuries than for less serious injuries. Some states also 
distinguish between injuries that result in amputations of a body mem-
ber and injuries that involve permanent loss of use of the body member. 
The former may be entitled to PPD benefits, while the latter may not.
A Taxonomy of State Systems of PPD Benefits
I am aware of three attempts to systematically classify states in 
terms of their approaches to PPD benefits relying on the three basic 
operational approaches discussed in the previous section and the dis-
tinctions among injuries just discussed. Berkowitz and Burton (1987) 
examined 10 states based on fieldwork and a literature review. The Na-
tional Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI 1995) classified all 
50 states plus the District of Columbia based on a questionnaire. The 
latest taxonomy of the 51 U.S. jurisdictions, on which the balance of 
this section is largely based, was prepared by Barth and Niss (1999).
The states and provinces in North America utilize the three opera-
tional approaches to work disability benefits and the one operational 
approach to nonwork disability benefits in a variety of systems of PPD 
benefits. Each jurisdiction has a system of PPD benefits because with-
out exception each jurisdiction makes some distinction among the types 
of injuries or diseases that affects either the operational approach for the 
benefits or the amount or duration of those benefits. This section briefly 
describes six systems of PPD benefits, each used in at least one North 
American jurisdiction. A more extended discussion, with examples of 
specific states, is included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). Some 
states do not neatly fit into the six systems, but I believe the taxonomy 
provides a good representation of the most important or interesting sys-
tems of PPD benefits.20 I begin with three systems of PPD benefits used 
in scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.
System I PPD benefits: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the permanent impairment approach 
for nonscheduled injuries
Most states have PPD benefit systems that distinguish between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. In about a dozen states that rely 
on this distinction, including New Jersey, both scheduled and nonsched-
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uled injuries receive PPD benefits based on the extent of permanent 
impairment. 
System II PPD benefits: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the loss of earning capacity approach for 
nonscheduled injuries
The System II design for PPD benefits draws a distinction between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in System 
I. Also, similar to System I, the scheduled injuries in System II are 
compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The distinctive 
feature of System II is that the nonscheduled benefits are based on the 
loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II). 
An interesting variant of System II is Wisconsin, which relies on 
Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury 
wage approach) for scheduled injuries.21 For nonscheduled injuries, 
there are two possibilities. If the worker has returned to work and is 
earning at least 85 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, the workers’ 
permanent impairment is rated. The duration of PPD benefits for such 
a worker is determined by multiplying the PI rating times 1,000 weeks. 
Thus, the Wisconsin PPD benefits for the worker who has returned to 
work and is earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages are based 
on Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury 
wage approach). 
If the worker with the nonscheduled injury has not returned to work 
and is earning at least 85 percent of the preinjury wage, the worker’s 
loss of earning capacity is determined. The evaluation of the LEC takes 
into account the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impairment, 
plus such factors as the worker’s age, education, and prior work experi-
ence. The evaluation produces a rating indicating the percentage loss 
in earning capacity due to the injury, and the rating is multiplied by 
1,000 weeks to determine the duration of the PPD benefits. Thus, the 
nonscheduled PPD benefits for Wisconsin workers who are not back to 
work earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages is based on Opera-
tional Approach II.A (the ad hoc loss of earning capacity approach). 
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System III PPD benefits: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the actual wage loss approach for 
nonscheduled injuries
The System III design for PPD benefits draws a distinction between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in Systems I 
and II. Also, similar to Systems I and II, the scheduled injuries in Sys-
tem III are compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The 
distinctive feature of System III is that the nonscheduled benefits are 
based on the actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III). 
New York is an example of a state relying on System III. The first 
step in New York in determining the applicable benefits for an injury 
with permanent consequences is to determine whether the injury is 
scheduled or unscheduled. The distinction is similar to that used in New 
Jersey and Wisconsin, where injuries to arms, legs, and other bodily 
extremities are classified as scheduled, and injuries to internal organs 
and the back are defined as unscheduled.22 In New York, the operational 
basis for scheduled PPD benefits is the permanent impairment and pre-
injury wage approach (Operational Approach I.B).
New York’s system relies on the actual wage loss approach for non-
scheduled benefits, which has several traits. One trait is that, unless 
the worker has actual earnings after the date of MMI that are less than 
the worker’s preinjury earnings, no benefits are paid even if the work 
injury has resulted in a permanent impairment or loss of earning capac-
ity.23 Another characteristic of the wage loss approach is that the total 
duration of the PPD benefits is not determined shortly after the date of 
MMI, as in the permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity ap-
proaches. Instead, the duration of benefits depends on the length of time 
the worker experiences actual losses of earnings due to the work injury. 
In New York, this duration can range from zero weeks (for those cases 
closed with no present wage loss) to the balance of the worker’s life. 
There are three outcomes possible for nonscheduled injuries in New 
York. First, if, at the time the case is initially classified as a nonsched-
uled PPD, the worker has returned to work and is experiencing no wage 
loss, the worker receives no PPD benefits and the case is closed.24
Second, if, at the time the case is initially classified as a nonsched-
uled PPD, the worker experiences a wage loss, benefits commence. The 
duration these benefits will continue is unknown because the duration 
of subsequent wage loss is unknown.25 
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In New York, there is a third outcome for a nonscheduled PPD case, 
namely a lump-sum settlement. The lump-sum settlement in New York 
is essentially a compromise and release agreement, in which the parties 
reach a compromise concerning the amount of benefits to be paid, the 
worker receives a lump-sum payment, and the employer is released from 
any further liability for the particular injury.26
System IV PPD benefits: Unitary rating system states with a 
single operational approach for PPD benefits
California is an example of a jurisdiction providing System IV PPD 
benefits in which all injuries are rated using the same approach. Califor-
nia relies on a formula to combine the impairment ratings with the age 
and occupational factors in order to produce a disability rating, which 
is Operational Approach II.B, the loss of earning capacity approach by 
formula approach. The California PPD system uses the disability rating 
to determine the duration of PPD benefits, using a formula that provides 
more weeks per percent rating for more serious injuries than for less 
serious injuries.27
System V PPD Benefits: Unitary rating system states 
with multiple operational approaches for PPD benefits 
(the hybrid approach)
The fifth system of PPD benefits is the hybrid approach, which 
potentially pays two types of PPD benefits on a sequential basis. The 
approach is used in Connecticut and Texas, and was used in Florida 
between 1994 and 2003.28 
In Texas, the initial phase of PPD benefits is based on Operational 
Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach). 
Once the worker reached the date of MMI, the extent of permanent im-
pairment for all injuries with permanent consequences is rated using 
the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Per-
manent Impairment. Three weeks of impairment benefits are then paid 
for each 1 percent impairment rating. The weekly benefit is 70 percent 
of the worker’s preinjury wage, subject to a maximum benefit that is 70 
percent of the state’s average weekly wage. 
Those workers who have a permanent impairment rating of at least 
15 percent have an opportunity to qualify for wage loss benefits (known 
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as “supplemental income benefits” in Texas) after the impairment ben-
efits expire (i.e., at least 45 weeks after the initial eligibility date for 
impairment benefits). The wage loss benefits are paid to workers who 
experienced at least a 20 percent drop in wages between the preinjury 
period and the period of permanent disability; 80 percent of the wage 
loss in excess of the 20 percent threshold is compensated (again subject 
to a maximum week benefit that is 70 percent of the state’s average 
weekly wage). The wage loss benefits in Texas are an example of the 
Operational Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach).
System VI PPD benefits: The dual benefits approach 
(nonwork disability benefits and/or work disability benefits), 
depending on the type of injury
A few jurisdictions have explicitly paid nonwork disability (or 
noneconomic loss) benefits in addition to work disability benefits. The 
System VI variant of dual PPD benefits was used in Florida from 1979 
until 1993, although some significant modifications were made in 1990 
prior to the total abandonment of the approach in 1993.  
The Florida program had two types of benefits—impairment ben-
efits and wage loss benefits—and an injured worker with permanent 
consequences of his or her injury could qualify for either, both,29 or 
neither of the benefits, depending on the facts in the case.
Impairment benefits were paid to workers with certain types of per-
manent impairments, including amputations, loss of 80 percent or more 
of vision, or serious head or facial disfigurements. Other types of per-
manent impairments, such as total or partial loss of use of a body mem-
ber without amputation, did not qualify for the benefits. The purpose of 
these “impairment benefits” was to compensate the worker for nonwork 
disability. The impairment benefits were paid using Operational Ap-
proach I.A (the “pure” permanent impairment approach).
The wage loss benefits contained in the 1979 Florida legislation 
required the worker to have at least a 1 percent permanent impairment 
rating. In addition, the worker had to experience at least a 15 percent 
decline between the wages in the preinjury period and the wages in the 
permanent disability period. The wage loss benefits then replaced 85 
percent of the actual wage loss in excess of the 15 percent threshold. 
This description of the dual benefits approach in Florida is simplis-
tic and does not capture the initial acclaim and eventual disillusionment 
94  Burton
with the approach, especially the wage loss component, which ulti-
mately led to the abandonment of the dual benefits approach in Florida 
after 1993. This overview of North American systems of PPD benefits 
would be remiss, however, if we did not mention that the dual benefits 
approach is still alive and apparently operating well in several Canadian 
provinces, including Ontario and Saskatchewan. 
Observations
This section has identified six different systems of PPD benefits, 
and others are possible. Several observations seem warranted, drawing 
in part on the survey of state PPD programs by Barth and Niss (1999).
First, the most common type appears to be System I, in which both 
scheduled and nonscheduled benefits are based on the permanent im-
pairment approach. Barth and Niss (1999) reported that about 13 juris-
dictions use this approach.30
Second, Systems III and VI, which contain elements of the actual 
wage loss approach that begin for some types of injuries at the date of 
MMI, appear to be under threat, at least in the United States. Florida 
has abandoned the dual benefits system (System VI), and Pennsylvania, 
which has used a variant of System III (in which scheduled benefits are 
based on the impairment approach and the nonscheduled benefits based 
on the actual wage loss approach)31 has recently added a qualification 
that benefits can be reduced even if the worker does not have actual 
earnings in the permanent disability period so long as the employer 
can establish that light-duty work is available within commuting dis-
tance.32
Third, use of System V, the hybrid approach, has received some 
recent interest. Florida used this approach between 1994 and 2003, and 
the current Connecticut and Texas statutes provide impairment benefits 
followed by wage loss benefits.
Fourth, I again want to emphasize the critical distinction between 1) 
the permanent impairment operational approach and the loss of earning 
capacity approach, and 2) the actual wage loss approach. The perma-
nent impairment and loss of earning capacity approaches will pay PPD 
benefits even if there is no actual loss of earnings so long as the worker 
can demonstrate that the work injury caused a diminution in one of the 
proxies for actual wage loss. In contrast, there must be actual losses of 
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earnings in the permanent disability period in order for benefits to be 
paid in the actual wage loss approach.
Fifth, compromise and release agreements, in which workers release 
their claim to future benefits in exchange for a lump-sum settlement, 
can turn the actual wage loss approach into the loss of earning capacity 
approach. That is, the compromise and release agreement transforms a 
case from one relying on the wage loss approach (where the amount of 
PPD benefits is unknown until the end of the period of permanent dis-
ability or the worker reaches the statutory maximum for such benefits) 
into a loss of earning capacity approach (where the amount of PPD 
benefits is determined near the beginning of the period of permanent 
disability based on an assessment of the extent of loss of earning capac-
ity). 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF PPD BENEFITS
Each North American workers’ compensation program provides 
PPD benefits. As previous sections indicate, there are three basic op-
erational approaches for PPD benefits, which have been used to de-
sign a variety of systems of PPD benefits. What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different operational approaches and PPD benefit 
systems? This section provides five criteria that can be used to answer 
these questions and attempts some answers. There are several caveats 
to this exercise: the criteria are not universally endorsed, there are only 
a limited number of studies that use the criteria in the evaluation of 
PPD benefits, the application of different criteria sometimes leads to 
conflicting assessments of the same program, and the existing literature 
generally does not compare the performance of the different basic op-
erational approaches or PPD benefit systems. These caveats mean there 
are virtually endless opportunities for research in this area.
Adequate Benefits
Definition of the adequacy criterion
The meaning of the adequacy criterion will only be briefly exam-
ined here because the topic is extensively examined in Hunt (2004), 
which is the result of a multiyear study by the National Academy of 
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Social Insurance (NASI).33 The primary test for adequacy adopted by 
NASI can be explained by reference to Figure 4.9. The NASI standard 
is that after the date of MMI, PPD benefits should replace two-thirds of 
the difference between the worker’s potential earnings (along line BC) 
and the worker’s actual earnings (along line FG). Alternatively stated, 
benefits are adequate if the replacement rate—the PPD benefits divided 
by “true” wage loss—is at least 66⅔ percent.34
Application of the adequacy criterion
The application of the adequacy criterion will also only be briefly 
examined here because the topic is examined by Boden, Reville, and 
Biddle in Chapter 3 of this volume. The essence of their findings is 
that in the five jurisdictions they examined (California, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin), PPD benefits replaced between 
16 and 26 percent of earnings losses in the 10 years after workers were 
injured, which meant the “replacement rates do not approach the two-
thirds benchmark for adequacy.”
Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) include a useful list of research 
topics concerning the adequacy of PPD benefits. What also needs to be 
examined is whether choices among the different operational approach-
es or PPD benefit systems identified in this chapter make any difference 
in the quest for adequacy? There is no obvious reason why the choices 
should make a difference, and there is no obvious pattern between the 
extent of adequacy and the design of the PPD benefit systems in the five 
jurisdictions studied by Boden, Reville, and Biddle. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, no one has studied this important question.
Another matter concerning adequacy discussed in Hunt (2004) is 
worth repeating. The best way to determine whether a state has ad-
equate benefits is to conduct a wage loss study, which examines the 
actual earnings losses of and benefits received by a large sample of in-
jured workers. But such studies are expensive and time consuming, and 
not all states have the requisite data. The issue is whether there is a mea-
sure of a state’s PPD benefits that is relatively easy to calculate (such as 
the actuarial assessments of the state’s workers’ compensation statutory 
provisions reported by Thomason and Burton [2001]) that provides a 
satisfactory proxy for the results of a wage loss study.
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Equitable Benefits
Definition of the equity criterion
The equity criterion for permanent disability benefits has two di-
mensions: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity re-
quires that workers who are equivalent should be treated equally.35 Thus 
workers with equal losses of earnings should receive equal benefits.36 A 
narrow test of vertical equity requires that workers with different losses 
of income should receive benefits proportional to their losses.37 A more 
general test for vertical equity only requires that there be a consistent 
relationship between losses and benefits. A state may decide, for ex-
ample, that the proportion of benefits to losses should increase (or de-
crease) as losses increase.38 
The previous paragraph applied the horizontal and vertical equity 
tests to the relationships between losses of earnings and benefits (the 
replacement rates). However, the equity tests can be applied to other as-
pects of PPD cases. For example, do workers with the same PPD rating 
have the same replacement rates?39 Other aspects of cases to which the 
equity tests could be applied include the workers’ characteristics, such 
as age, occupation, and sex, the types of injuries experienced by work-
ers, and workers’ compensation system characteristics, such as whether 
the case was litigated or not.
Application of the equity criterion
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 341–353) compared earnings 
losses, benefits, and replacement rates for California workers injured 
in 1968 for workers of different ages, injury types, severity of injuries, 
and three types of cases: 1) formal, in which a formal PPD rating was 
received from the Disability Evaluation Unit; 2) informal, in which an 
informal PPD rating was received; and 3) other. They found significant 
equity problems with the California PPD benefits as of that time, such 
as the lower replacement rates for contested cases with trunk injuries 
compared to injuries to other parts of the body. Similar equity problems 
were found for the PPD benefits in Wisconsin and Florida.
Reville et al. (forthcoming) examined the equity of the PPD rat-
ing system in the California workers’ compensation program and found 
large differences among types of injuries in the relationship between 
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average disability ratings and average earnings losses. For example, 
PPD cases involving injuries to the elbow had a 1.86 ratio between the 
disability ratings and average earnings losses, while cases involving the 
shoulder had a 0.90 ratio between ratings and losses.
The 2004 amendments to the California workers’ compensation 
program will allow the program to adjust the ratings and benefits for 
different types of injuries based on empirical evidence of the sort devel-
oped by Reville et al. (forthcoming), which should make a major con-
tribution to improving the equity of the California PPD benefit system. 
But are there other operational approaches or benefit systems that could 
do even a better job of providing PPD benefits that are equitable? One 
of the rationales for the adoption of the wage loss approach in Florida 
in 1979 was a better ability to provide benefits to workers in proportion 
to their earnings losses. But we lack evidence about whether the Florida 
wage loss approach (while it lasted) or the variants of wage loss ap-
proach used in other states achieved greater equity.40 
Delivery System Efficiency
Definition of the delivery system efficiency criterion
The benefits and services in workers’ compensation are provided 
by a delivery system comprised of employers, carriers, state agencies, 
attorneys, doctors, and other participants. Berkowitz and Burton (1987, 
pp. 26–28) evaluated the efficiency of this delivery system by examin-
ing the relationship between two variables. One variable measures the 
administrative costs of providing benefits incurred by the participants 
in the workers’ compensation delivery system. The other variable mea-
sures the quality of the workers’ compensation benefits, where quality 
is assessed on the basis of one or more of the other criteria used to 
evaluate a PPD benefits system, such as adequacy and equity.  
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 27–28) suggest that one meaning 
of delivery system efficiency, panoramic efficiency, is that benefits of a 
particular quality are provided at the least possible administrative costs. 
Another meaning of delivery system efficiency, myopic efficiency, is 
only concerned with reducing administrative costs without concern for 
the quality of the program. 
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Application of the delivery system efficiency criterion 
Evaluation using the delivery system efficiency criterion is espe-
cially difficult.41 For one thing, data on the expenses of administering 
the program that are borne by employers and others in the private sec-
tor, plus the amount of attorneys’ fees for both workers and employers, 
as well as other types of data relevant to the assessment of the efficiency 
of the delivery system are scarce. Another reason the delivery system 
efficiency criterion is hard to apply is that the quality of the benefits and 
the administrative costs must be simultaneously considered in order to 
evaluate the panoramic efficiency of a state’s workers’ compensation 
program.
An important aspect of the delivery system efficiency test con-
cerns the delivery system model used to provide workers’ compensa-
tion benefits. One model relies on an active state agency that makes 
many decisions itself, closely supervises the operation of employers 
and private carriers, and limits the role for attorneys.42 A considerably 
different model relies on the private parties, particularly attorneys, to 
make most of the decisions about benefits payments.43 The agency is 
essentially passive, although it will resolve disputes brought to it by 
the private parties. An intermediate model involves a state agency that 
conducts a minimal review of decisions made by the private parties and 
that resolves disputes in a relatively high proportion of the cases, but 
that nonetheless relies on extensive attorney involvement to make the 
delivery system operate.44
How attorneys are used is an important feature differentiating these 
three delivery system models. As recounted by many commentators on 
the history of workers’ compensation, the original notion was that the 
elimination of the fault concept and the prescription of benefits by stat-
ute would enable employees to protect their interests without external 
assistance. From that standpoint, the substantial reliance on lawyers 
suggests at the minimum a lack of myopic efficiency. And yet the in-
volvement of attorneys can also be viewed as a prima facie indictment 
of the idea that workers’ compensation laws can be self-administering; 
attorneys may be in the system because they help achieve the criteria 
of adequate and equitable benefits. In other words, the involvement of 
attorneys may represent a lack of myopic efficiency but not necessarily 
a lack of panoramic efficiency.
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Whether, in fact, attorneys help achieve the equity and adequacy 
of benefits is not clear a priori. On one hand, they receive fees that 
generally are subtracted from the workers’ awards, which, in a nominal 
sense, reduces the adequacy of the benefits. On the other hand, attor-
neys may increase the awards in some cases in which they are involved 
and possibly have an indirect impact on the amount of benefits in other 
cases in which they are not involved. Thus on a priori grounds, the 
impact of attorneys on the adequacy of benefits is unclear. Likewise, 
the impact of attorneys on the equity of benefits is unclear. They may 
take cases in which benefits would otherwise be inappropriately low, 
or, alternatively, their involvement may be on a basis unrelated to the 
relative under compensation of the case, such as the worker’s member-
ship in a union.
Thomason and Burton (1993) studied the effect of attorney involve-
ment on the outcome of cases paying nonscheduled PPD benefits in 
New York, and found that attorneys increase the probability of lump-
sum settlements, reduce the amounts of those settlements, and have no 
statistically significant effect on the size of litigated awards. While this 
study is confined to one state, it suggests that assuming the use of attor-
neys improves the adequacy or equity of PPD benefits is inappropriate 
without supporting evidence.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) compared Florida, California, and 
Wisconsin and concluded that Wisconsin had the best record of delivery 
system efficiency at the time. The Wisconsin benefits were more ade-
quate and equitable than those in California and Florida, while the costs 
of the Wisconsin delivery system—including the expenses of operating 
the state agency as well as the cost of attorneys’ fees for claimants, em-
ployers, and carriers—were lower than those in the other two states.45
I am unaware of any research that systematically considers the pos-
sible relationship of delivery system efficiency to different operational 
approaches to benefits and PPD benefit systems. PPD benefit systems 
that rely on the permanent impairment or loss of earnings capacity ap-
proaches to benefits are likely to require fewer resources to operate than 
benefit systems that incorporate elements of the actual wage loss ap-
proach (because the latter approach requires cases to remain open for 
extended periods and to be periodically monitored), which means the 
wage loss approach is probably less efficient using the myopic meaning 
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of efficiency. But is the wage loss approach less or more efficient using 
the panoramic meaning of efficiency?
Prevention, Compensation, and Rehabilitation (PCR) Efficiency
Definition of PCR system efficiency
PCR system efficiency is concerned with avoiding adverse effects 
of the PPD benefits on the fundamental objectives of the workers’ dis-
ability system, namely to prevent injuries and diseases; to compensate 
disabled workers adequately and equitably; and to rehabilitate workers 
and return them to work.46 
Applying the PCR system efficiency criterion to the prevention 
objective
One of the objectives of the PCR system is the prevention of inju-
ries and diseases among workers. Increasing the level of PPD benefits 
can have a number of effects on the behavior of employers and employ-
ees.47 Because the premiums for the employers of most workers are 
experience rated, the higher PPD benefits cause the potential costs of 
the workers’ compensation program to increase for employers. These 
higher potential workers’ compensation costs should lead to behavioral 
changes by employers, which have been labeled the “safety effect.” The 
safety effect includes all those safety improvements (including not only 
changes in the physical plant, but changes in training, safety monitor-
ing, etc.) that are cost-effective. Although the theory that experience 
rating provides safety incentives has been postulated since the first state 
workers’ compensation program was enacted in Wisconsin in 1911, 
there is still a controversy about whether that theory is valid. Thomason 
(2003) indicates that most recent studies show that experience rating 
does matter for safety, and to the extent this is true, then increasing PPD 
benefits has an indirect effect that is desirable.
There are, however, other effects of increasing the level of PPD 
benefits. A number of studies during the last 15 years have shown that, 
as statutory workers’ compensation benefits rise, both claims frequen-
cy and the reported severity of injuries increase. For example, Butler 
(1994, I–85) indicates that claims frequency rises from 3 to 8 percent in 
response to a 10 percent increase in the real level of benefits.
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Whether the increased frequency and severity are adverse conse-
quences of the higher PPD benefits depends on the nature of the chang-
es in employee behavior that result in these increases. The “true injury 
effect” postulates that workers will take less care on the job (and thus 
incur more work injuries) because the higher benefits mean they will 
have increased income security if they are injured. The “reporting ef-
fect” postulates that workers will report claims for injuries that would 
not have been reported in the absence of the greater monetary incentives 
resulting from the higher potential benefits. The “duration effect” pos-
tulates that workers will extend their period of reported disability (and 
thus increase the apparent severity) because of the higher benefits.48
If the evidence demonstrating that higher benefits result in increased 
frequency and severity of injuries were due to the true injury effect, this 
would be considered an unintended and adverse consequence of the 
higher benefits. Fortunately, Durbin and Butler (1998) report that most 
recent studies argue that the true injury effect is not the major reason 
for the positive relationship between benefits and the measures of work-
place safety. Instead, the relationships appear to primarily be due to the 
reporting effect and the duration effect.
Applying the PCR system efficiency test to the rehabilitation 
objective
There are circumstances in which workers’ compensation benefits 
can be so high as to induce the reporting effect or the duration effect, 
and in which greater utilization is an undesirable outcome. The most 
egregious example of PPD benefits that were inadvertently designed to 
have a serious disincentive for reemployment is the wage loss benefits 
enacted by the Florida legislature in 1979.49 The law provided that, once 
a worker experienced at least a 15 percent drop in income after the 
date of MMI due to the work injury, the PPD benefits would replace 
95 percent of the wage loss above that 15 percent threshold. This ben-
efit formula meant that, for a worker who had begun the rehabilitation 
process and had already returned to work one-third time, a decision 
to increase work to two-thirds time would lead to a reduction in PPD 
benefits that would be 103 percent of the increase in net earnings (gross 
wages minus taxes) resulting from the additional hours worked. Surely 
this disincentive was an unintended and adverse consequence of the 
1979 Florida PPD benefits scheme. Disincentives to this extent are not 
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inevitable in a wage loss system, but the poor design of these benefits 
was one reason why the wage loss approach in Florida has subsequently 
been virtually vitiated. In short, the 1979 PPD benefits in Florida failed 
to meet the PCR system efficiency test because the benefits undermined 
the rehabilitation and return-to-work objective.
The wage loss approach appears to be more likely to undermine 
PCR efficiency than the impairment approach and the loss of earning 
capacity approach, since workers’ compensation benefits are reduced 
if the worker has increased earnings, while the PPD benefits are not 
affected by greater employment after the date of MMI in the other ap-
proaches. However, there has been little if any evidence on the magni-
tudes of the differences between the approaches in their ability to pro-
mote or hinder PCR efficiency.
Affordability
Affordability is concerned with designing a system of PPD benefits 
that employers, workers, and the public can afford without serious ad-
verse consequences, such as loss of jobs. 
A historical perspective on affordability
Affordability generally has not been explicitly recognized as a cri-
terion for evaluating workers’ compensation programs in general and a 
system of PPD benefits in particular. However, the importance of afford-
ability was recognized in the National Commission Report (National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws 1972, p. 125):
While the facts dictate that no State should hesitate to improve 
its workmen’s compensation program for fear of losing employers, 
unfortunately this appears to be an area where emotion too often 
triumphs over fact . . . whenever a State legislature contemplates 
an improvement in workmen’s compensation which will increase 
insurance costs, the legislators will hear claims from some em-
ployers that the increase in costs will force a business exodus. It 
will be virtually impossible for the legislators to know how genu-
ine are these claims . . .
When the sum of these inhibiting factors is considered, it 
seems likely that many States have been dissuaded from reform 
of their workmen’s compensation statute because of the specter 
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of the vanishing employer, even if that apparition is a product of 
fancy not fact. A few States have achieved genuine reform, but 
most suffer with inadequate laws because of the drag of laws of 
competing States.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws 
offered a solution to the inhibitions to reform caused by potential em-
ployer departures. That solution was federal standards for 19 essential 
attributes of state workers’ compensation programs pertaining to extent 
of coverage and levels of benefits. 
While the affordability issue was obviously important 30 years 
ago—it likely was the major reason why the commission recommended 
federal standards—it has become even more important in recent de-
cades. One ironical reason is the legacy of the commission. While fed-
eral standards were never enacted, for a period in the 1970s the threat 
of standards was taken seriously and many states improved the levels 
of cash benefits in their workers’ compensation programs. One conse-
quence of the higher benefits was higher costs: the average costs nation-
ally peaked at about 2.2 percent of payroll in the early 1990s, almost 
double the percentage in the early 1970s. Employers’ costs relative to 
payroll have since dropped in response to various factors, including a 
declining injury rate and more stringent eligibility rules for workers’ 
compensation programs (Spieler and Burton 1998). Moreover, the dif-
ferences in costs of workers’ compensation insurance have probably 
widened since 1972,50 which means the specter of the vanishing em-
ployer is more credible now than it was when the National Commission 
characterized the threat as “a product of fancy not fact.” Compounding 
the runaway employer concern in recent years is the substantial loss of 
manufacturing jobs in many states and the widely publicized bout with 
high workers’ compensation costs in California.
Affordability for whom?
The definition of the affordability criterion indicated that the pur-
pose is to design a system of PPD benefits that employers, workers, and 
the public can afford without serious adverse consequences, such as 
loss of jobs. The primary focus in the affordability discussion is usually 
on the costs of workers’ compensation to employers in the form of in-
surance premiums or the equivalent expenditures by self-insuring em-
ployers. However, the affordability criteria must be formulated in terms 
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of the three possible bearers of the costs of workers’ compensation.51 
Employers are likely to bear much of the cost of higher workers’ 
compensation premiums in the short run in the form of lower profits, 
and in the long run are also likely to experience some reduction in prof-
its. Consumers also bear part of the cost of higher workers’ compensa-
tion benefits and premiums in the long run in the form of higher prices 
and reduced consumption. Workers also bear part of the cost of higher 
workers’ compensation benefits and premiums in the long run in the 
form of lower wages and less employment. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that workers bear most of the costs of higher benefits in the form 
of lower wages. To be sure, workers are also the primary beneficia-
ries of the higher benefits, but those benefits are largely paid for by the 
workers in the form of lower wages.
This point is worth emphasizing because the debates over work-
ers’ compensation reform in general, and PPD reform in particular, are 
generally cast as a trade-off between adequacy of benefits (which pre-
sumably is primarily of interest to workers) and affordability (which 
presumably is primarily of interest to employers). In fact, there are posi-
tive aspects for employers of more adequate benefits (including higher 
morale and greater productivity among workers who feel they are being 
treated fairly, as well as the lower wages that eventually will result from 
the higher benefits),52 and there are negative aspects for workers from 
higher benefits (including loss of jobs and lower wages). 
Observations on the Criteria
There is a danger expanding the evaluation criterion from the tradi-
tional trinity (adequacy, equity, and efficiency) to the five criteria pre-
sented in this chapter. This is particularly true because the criteria often 
come into conflict in evaluating PPD benefit systems, and the more cri-
teria we use, the greater the number of conflicts and trade-offs that must 
be considered in the evaluation process.
I am persuaded, however, that the use of all five criteria serves a 
useful purpose. Efficiency is a term that has been used by some econo-
mists to include both what I term delivery system efficiency and preven-
tion compensation, and rehabilitation system efficiency, and the explicit 
separation should help distinguish between the two meanings of effi-
ciency. Affordability has seldom been explicitly mentioned as a crite-
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rion, but has always been an implicit factor lurking in the background. 
Indeed, in recent years, affordability may have de facto become the 
dominant criterion in the reform of PPD benefits in many states, and ex-
plicit recognition of affordability as a criterion may improve the policy 
debates associated with efforts to reform PPD benefits.
Researchers and policymakers may find my list of five evaluation 
criteria too cumbersome, and I encourage efforts to develop a more 
parsimonious set of evaluations standards. Yet there is also the possibil-
ity that the list of factors that govern the design of PPD benefit systems 
is incomplete. Perhaps a missing criterion that would help explain the 
evolution of PPD benefit systems is risk minimization or risk shifting: 
how can the system be designed to reduce the overall uncertainty as-
sociated with the payment of PPD benefits, or how can the system be 
designed to reduce the risks of long-term disability borne by the partici-
pants in the workers’ compensation system with the greatest political 
influence?
CONCLUSIONS 
I have tried to provide an organized approach to examining PPD ben-
efits, to summarize some of the research literature, and to pose some areas 
where additional research is needed. I conclude by posing a few more 
questions I hope a new generation of scholars will examine.
One question that warrants contemplation is whether the conceptual 
framework presented in the second section is the most useful organi-
zational structure for research and operational purposes? For example, 
perhaps the number of consequences can be reduced: the Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment published by the American Medical 
Association (2000) do not distinguish between permanent impairments 
and functional limitations.
The fifth section provides an overview of how the states design their 
systems of PPD benefits. Are the six systems the best way to categorize 
the many varieties of state laws? And what explains why different states 
have adopted similar or different PPD benefit systems? Moreover, how 
do we explain why some states (such as New Jersey) have PPD benefit 
systems that have basically been unchanged since the early years of 
workers’ compensation in the United States, while other states have 
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made major changes in their systems? The most notable example of a 
state that has tried a variety of approaches in the last 40 years is Florida. 
Is this due to a commendable willingness to learn from weaknesses of 
prior approaches, or to impatience, or to unrealistic expectations?
The final section offers several criteria for the evaluation of PPD 
benefit systems. In addition to the questions I raise about whether the 
list of criteria is too long or too short (or just right!), more attention 
needs to be devoted to the trade-offs among the criteria. Thomason, 
Schmidle, and Burton (2001) present evidence that one of the major 
determinants of the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insur-
ance is the percentage of cases paying PPD benefits. They also devote 
a chapter to benefit adequacy versus affordability, and conclude that if 
states were to adopt adequate benefits (as prescribed by the Model Act 
issued by the Council of State Governments [1974]), the result would 
be substantially higher workers’ costs nationally, as well as greater dis-
persion of costs among states. Whether this trade-off between adequacy 
and affordability is accurate deserves scrutiny. The more fundamental 
point is that research and policy making would benefit from explicit 
consideration of trade-offs among criteria, rather than reforms based on 
a single goal, such as reducing employers’ costs.
Notes
 1.  Workers’ compensation programs provide cash, medical, and rehabilitation ben-
efits to workers disabled by work-related injuries and diseases. This chapter fo-
cuses solely on cash benefits.
 2.  For this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, the term injuries includes both inju-
ries and diseases.
 3.  Steve Guo, a Rutgers University graduate student, is examining the determinants 
of interstate differences in incurred benefits for his Master’s thesis.
 4.  A more extended discussion of the consequences of injuries is included in 
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 5–13).
 5.  The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable is not as clear as the 
text suggests. For example, the quality of vocational rehabilitation is identified 
as a controllable factor in the progression from functional limitations to loss of 
earning capacity. However, for a particular worker in a state that does not require 
employers to provide vocational rehabilitation, vocational rehabilitation is ef-
fectively uncontrollable.
 6.  Although this definition of “true” wage loss is appropriate for many purposes, it 
is not the measure of wage loss typically encompassed in a workers’ compensa-
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tion statute, which usually measures restricted wage loss. That is, the worker’s 
earnings as of the date of injury are projected into the future at that level. Then 
the “restricted” wage loss is measured as the difference between the worker’s 
preinjury wages and the worker’s actual earnings after the date of injury. In gen-
eral, “restricted” wage loss is smaller than “true” wage loss. 
 7.  The issues of measuring wage losses and benefits are also examined in Berkow-
itz and Burton (1987, pp. 365–389). 
 8.  An extended discussion of which consequences should be compensable is pro-
vided in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 20–22).
 9.  Some jurisdictions do not compensate for pain and suffering per se, but do con-
sider pain and suffering in determining the extent of the loss of earning capacity 
resulting from the injury. Thus in the California workers’ compensation program, 
Swezey (2003, § 5.40) indicates, “It is important to note that pain and suffering 
as such are not ratable. Pain is ratable only to the extent it causes disability.”
10.  The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1972, 
p. 38) justified the payment of impairment benefits in terms of a broad set of 
consequences: “The argument for impairment benefits is that many workers with 
work-related injuries or diseases experience losses which are not reflected in lost 
remuneration. Permanent impairment involves lifetime effects on the personality 
and on normal activity.”
 11.  This chapter uses the terms states, provinces, and jurisdictions interchangeably.
 12.  This three-category scheme is adapted from the taxonomy in Berkowitz and Bur-
ton (1987).
 13.  The rating systems for this approach typically contain a mixture of impair-
ment ratings (amputations are given a specified rating without any requirement 
to measure the resulting loss of function) and functional limitations ratings (loss 
of use of a limb typically is rated by examining the loss of function caused by the 
injury).
 14.  Idaho uses the “pure” loss of earning capacity approach for nonscheduled PPD 
benefits. The degree of loss of earning capacity is multiplied by 500 weeks to 
determine the duration of the benefits. The weekly benefit is 55 percent of the 
state average weekly wage for all workers.
 15.  States differ on which of the permanent consequences (permanent impairment, 
functional limitations, or loss of earning capacity) must be demonstrated, and 
differ as well on the extent of these consequences that are required for wage loss 
benefits to be paid.
 16.  In both Florida and Ontario, the primary basis for assessment has been the AMA 
Guides. Research by Sinclair and Burton (1995) on noneconomic loss benefits in 
Ontario raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of using the AMA Guides 
permanent impairment ratings as a proxy for the extent of noneconomic loss. 
 17.  Additional examples of programs that distinguish between injuries and diseases 
are included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). The examples are from U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (2003, Chart IV).
18.  In addition, states commonly schedule benefits for the enucleation of an eye and 
for hearing and vision loss.
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 19.  Examples of the “unitary rating system” are the System IV and System V PPD 
Benefits discussed in the next subsection.
 20.  The six systems of PPD benefits are based in part on Burton (1996). In the cur-
rent study, the states were assigned to the categories largely based on the descrip-
tions of the PPD benefits included in Barth and Niss (1999), who may not agree 
with the systems used in this chapter. Some states, e.g., Arizona and New York, 
are classified differently by Barth and Niss than in my taxonomy.
 21.  The distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries in Wisconsin is 
similar to that in New Jersey, with injuries to arms, legs, hands, etc., listed in the 
statutory schedule, while injuries to backs and internal organs are nonscheduled 
injuries. The scheduled durations in the two jurisdictions differ, however. An 
arm, for example, is worth 500 weeks in Wisconsin compared to 330 weeks in 
New Jersey. 
 22.  The scheduled durations are, to be sure, different among the states, with the New 
York arm worth only 312 weeks.
23.  This is a crucial difference between the true wage loss approach and the loss of 
earning capacity approach; a worker who experiences a loss of earning capacity 
but has no actual loss of earnings is precluded from benefits in the wage loss ap-
proach but is not precluded in the loss of earning capacity approach.
24.  The worker’s eligibility for nonscheduled benefits, as well as the weekly amount 
of those benefits, can change through time in jurisdictions using the wage loss 
approach. For example, in New York a worker whose case is initially closed with 
no benefits because of no present wage loss can reopen the case for up to 18 years 
after the date of injury or 8 years after the last benefit payments. PPD benefits can 
commence after the reopening if the work injury is then causing lost earnings. 
 25.  As discussed by Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 244–248) the exact variant 
of the actual wage loss approach used for New York workers with at least some 
actual wage loss depends on whether the worker has any earnings during the 
permanent disability period. If the worker has some earnings, then the “pure” ac-
tual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A) is used. Thus, if a worker 
had preinjury wages of $500 per week and returns to employment at $200 per 
week, the nonscheduled benefits is two-thirds of the wage loss, which means 
the weekly benefit is $200. (The weekly PPD benefit is subject to a maximum 
amount, which as of 2004 is $400 per week.) If the worker does not have any 
earnings in the permanent disability period, then the limited actual wage loss ap-
proach (Operational Approach III.B) is used. The worker’s loss of earning capac-
ity is evaluated and serves as a limit on the worker’s wage loss. Thus, if a worker 
had preinjury wages of $500, does not return to work and is rated as having a 50 
percent loss of earning capacity, the weekly PPD benefit is $166.67. 
 26.  The use of compromise and release agreements in the New York workers’ com-
pensation program was examined in Thomason and Burton (1993).
 27.  The life pension is a weekly benefit that is 1.5 percent of the worker’s preinjury 
wage for each 1 percent of disability over 60 percent (subject to a maximum weekly 
benefit) Swezey (2003, Sec. 5.9). The California PPD benefits system draws an-
other distinction among workers depending on the magnitude of the disability 
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rating. A disability rating of 100 percent qualifies the worker for permanent total 
disability benefits for life. A disability rating between 1 and 69.75 percent quali-
fies a worker for PPD benefits. For workers with a disability rating between 70 
and 99.75, the worker qualifies for PPD benefits using the formula summarized 
above, and when those PPD benefits expire, the worker qualifies for a life pen-
sion.
 28.  Texas and Florida use Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and 
preinjury approach) for the initial phase of their PPD benefits and Operational 
Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach) for the second phase of 
their PPD benefits. Connecticut uses Operational Approach I.B (the permanent 
impairment and preinjury approach) for the initial phase of the PPD benefits 
and Operational Approach III.A (the “pure” actual wage loss approach) for the 
second phase of the PPD benefits. 
 29.  The possibility that a worker with a single injury could receive both impairment 
and wage loss benefits is different than the System I, II, and III PPD benefits, 
where a worker with a single injury qualifies for either scheduled or nonsched-
uled benefits. (There are occasional exceptions to this pronouncement regarding 
System I and System II benefits, such as a scheduled injury that has psychologi-
cal overlays that are nonscheduled.)
 30.  The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) (1995) indicated that 
of the 42 states in which some permanent partial injuries are compensated on a 
nonscheduled basis, eight states use the actual wage loss approach, 26 states use 
the impairment approach, and 14 states use some other approach (in most cases, 
probably the loss of earning capacity approach). As indicated in my review of the 
NCCI Inventory (Burton 1995), I think that Arizona is actually a loss of earning 
capacity state (not a wage loss state) and that New York is actually a wage loss 
state (not an “other” state). However, these misclassifications should not affect 
the textual conclusion that the System I version of PPD benefits, in which the 
impairment approach is used for nonscheduled benefits, is the most common 
system.
 31.  Pennsylvania’s PPD benefits are described in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, 
Chapter 8).
 32.  A brief report on the recent “reforms” of the Pennsylvania workers’ compensa-
tion law is provided at 7 BNA’s Workers’ Compensation Report 319 (June 14, 
1996).
 33.  Examinations of the adequacy criterion are also found in Berkowitz and Burton 
(1987, pp. 365–373) and Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).
34.  This formulation of the adequacy test assumes that the sole purpose of PPD cash 
benefits is to compensate for work disability.
 35.  The equity tests can be applied to workers within a state (e.g., do workers in 
Idaho with equal losses of earnings receive equal benefits, thus satisfying the 
horizontal equity test for that jurisdiction?) as well as to workers in different 
states (e.g., do workers in Indiana and Massachusetts with similar losses of wag-
es receive similar benefits, thus satisfying an interstate horizontal equity test?). 
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36.  If workers A and B both have $1,000 of earnings losses, and worker A receives 
$700 of benefits (and thus has a 70 percent replacement rate) and worker B re-
ceives $300 of benefits (a 30 percent replacement rate), then the horizontal eq-
uity test has been violated.
 37.  If worker C has $5,000 of earnings losses and received $3,000 of benefits, while 
worker D has $10,000 of earnings losses, then the narrow test of vertical equity 
requires that worker D receive $6,000 of benefits (so that the replacement rate for 
both workers is 60 percent). 
38.  Although the general formulation of vertical equity is more difficult to translate 
into empirical tests than the narrow test, reasonable requirements appear to be 1) 
that the ratio of benefits to earnings consistently increase (or decrease) as earn-
ings losses increase, and not fluctuate as losses increase, and 2) that there should 
be no abrupt changes in the ratio of benefits to earnings losses as those losses 
increase. The more general test of vertical equity would be violated if worker 
E had $1,000 of earning losses and received $700 of benefits (for a 70 percent 
replacement rate), worker F had $2,000 of earnings losses and received $1,000 of 
benefits (for a 50 percent replacement rate), and worker G had $3,000 of earnings 
losses and received $2,700 of benefits (for a 90 percent replacement rate).
39.  If worker H has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 40 percent replacement rate, while 
worker I has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 70 percent replacement rate, there is 
a lack of horizontal equity among PPD ratings. 
40.  It appears likely that the widespread use of compromise and release agreements 
in Florida undercut the potential for greater equity from benefits based on the 
wage loss approach, but that is mere speculation.
41.  Roberts (2003) is one of the few studies that have examined the efficiency of 
workers’ compensation delivery systems, including the effects of workers’ com-
pensation agency activism on outcomes for employers, employees, and insur-
ance carriers.
42.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Wisconsin as an example of this approach.
43.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used the federally operated Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensate Act as an example of this approach.
44.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Florida and California as examples of this 
approach when they conducted their study of workers injured in 1968.
45.  The positive assessment of the efficiency of the Wisconsin workers’ compensa-
tion program is based on a study involving injuries that occurred in 1968. Based 
on inconsistent and fragmentary information, I am not certain that the current 
Wisconsin workers’ compensation program would receive an equally positive 
assessment. Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) found that the PPD benefits in 
Wisconsin were less adequate than the PPD benefits in the other four jurisdic-
tions examined in their study. In addition, Berkowitz and Pascale (1995) graded 
the annual reports of state workers’ compensation agencies, and Wisconsin was 
one of the six jurisdictions that received an F because it had not issued an annual 
report. However, in a more recent evaluation of workers’ compensation agency 
websites, Berkowitz (2001) assigned Wisconsin (and 12 other jurisdictions) an A 
grade.
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46.  The prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation system includes an array of 
programs. The prevention components of the workers’ compensation program 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act; the cash benefits provided by public 
programs (such as workers’ compensation and the disability insurance compo-
nent of the Social Security system), and by employers (such as long-term dis-
ability benefits); the health care provided by public programs (such as workers’ 
compensation and Medicaid) and by employers (such as group health plans); 
and the rehabilitation provided by workers’ compensation programs and by state 
vocational rehabilitation agencies are examples of these programs.
47.  These behavioral effects are discussed in Butler (1994) and Burton and Chelius 
(1997).
48.  The threefold distinction among the true injury effect, the reporting effect, and 
the duration effect is an extension of the twofold distinction used by Butler 
(1994).
49.  This provision of the Florida law is examined in more detail in Burton (1983, pp. 
40–49).
50.  Burton and Schmidle (1992, Table 8, pp. 1–15) indicate that the means and stan-
dard deviations (in parentheses) for average insurance rates for 44 insurance 
classes for weighted observations from 42 states were 0.772 (0.273) in 1972 
and 0.996 (0.339) in 1975. Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Table C.18, 
p. 376) report that the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the 
average insurance rates for 71 insurance classes for weighted observations for 
42 states were 0.910 (0.377) in 1975 and 2.929 (0.823) in 1995. The standard de-
viation is a statistical measure of the dispersion among the observations (in this 
case, states) and thus the data indicate the dispersion among states in the costs 
of workers’ compensation insurance roughly tripled between 1972 and 1995. 
Although more recent data using a consistent measure or workers’ compensation 
insurance rates are not available, it seems unlikely that the interstate differences 
in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance have narrowed appreciably 
since 1995.
 51.  This discussion of the incidence of the costs of the workers’ compensation pro-
gram is based on Chelius and Burton (1992, 1994), which are reprinted in Bur-
ton and Schmidle (1995). Their approach is summarized in Leigh et al. (2000, 
p. 178) who assert “Chelius and Burton (1994) conclude that all premiums are 
passed down to workers in the form of lower wages. They acknowledge that 
their conclusion is ‘radical’ (25).” More precisely, Chelius and Burton (1994, 
pp. 24–25) summarized the research of Moore and Viscusi (1990) as “radical” 
in this passage: “The conclusion that may be inferred from the finding of this 
study—that higher workers’ compensation benefits, from the employer’s per-
spective, more than pay for themselves in the form of lower wages—is a radical 
one that undoubtedly will be sharply contested by many members of the workers’ 
compensation community.” Chelius and Burton’s own views were more modest 
(1994, p. 26): “We have a reasonable degree of confidence that social science 
research has indeed provided an answer to our question of who actually pays for 
workers’ compensation: a substantial proportion of workers’ compensation costs 
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(and even, according to some estimates, all of the costs) are shifted onto work-
ers.” (Italics in the original.)
52.  If the costs of higher workers’ compensation benefits are largely paid for by em-
ployees in the form of lower wages and reduced employment, then why do em-
ployers place so much emphasis on the affordability criterion when reforms of 
PPD benefits are undertaken? First, many employers are unaware of the economic 
analysis that suggests that workers bear much of the costs of improved benefits in 
the form of lower wages. Or, if they are aware of the argument, they are not per-
suaded by the logic or supporting evidence. Second, in the short run, the costs of 
higher workers’ compensation benefits are largely borne by employers in the form 
of lower profits until prices and wages can be adjusted to reflect these higher costs. 
 Third, the affordability issue does not just involve employers and workers 
in the U.S. workers’ compensation programs, but also involves private carriers. 
Much of the zeal for reform of PPD benefits in the early 1990s can be traced to 
the significant underwriting losses that workers’ compensation carriers experi-
enced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whatever advantages may accrue to 
employers from more adequate benefits, much of the cost of the workers’ com-
pensation program was being borne by carriers for whom higher workers’ com-
pensation insurance rates were harder to obtain from employers and regulators 
than were lower insurance rates resulting from legislative reforms that reduced 
benefits.
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